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The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security

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The term “security” is as ambiguous in content as in format: is it a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline? There is no one concept of security; “national security,” “international security,” and “global security” refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts. The author argues that the concept of international security might most appropriately describe current security affairs. She challenges the concept of national security as fixated on the nation-state and not taking into account the security of other states. She criticizes the notion of global security as presupposing a world-wide common definition of security and shared sets of values, rules, and principles not yet existing. In the long term, however, the world might be moving in the direction of a global security system if institution-building continues and leads to common practices, rules, and enforcement capabilities. As all concepts yield only limited explanations and are of marginal value for theory-building, the essay identifies some assumptions and questions to be clarified in future research programs. In a closing section the field of international security studies and its relationship to international relations are discussed.

Introduction

The term “security” is as ambiguous in content as in format: is it a goal, an issue-area a concept, a research program, or a discipline? There is no one concept of security; “national security,” “international security,” and “global security” refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts. Which one offers the most convincing explanation of the many changes in security relations we are witnessing? If none is convincing, we as social scientists are called upon to construct suitable research programs that will yield more satisfactory results. As children of the Enlightenment, we seek knowledge in order to improve the quality of human action (Keohane, 1989:158). As survivors of World War II, we are committed to promote international peace and individual freedom in the world we

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live in. As teachers, we ask how security studies as an academic field can be clarified, what we should teach, and how our curricula should be designed.

With these tasks in mind, I will first analyze the philosophical and historical contexts of the concepts of national security, international security, and global security. My main argument is that each relates to a different philosophical tradition as well as to a specific historical interpretation of international relations. Second, I will attempt to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each concept. In a quasi-anarchical global system, though with a growing consciousness of the "security dilemma" (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978) and increasing regime building in process (Krasner, 1983), I consider the concept of international security most appropriate to current security affairs. I will, therefore, challenge the concept of national security as fixated on the nation-state and not taking into account the security of other states. I will also criticize the notion of global security as presupposing a common definition of security world-wide and shared sets of values, rules, and principles not yet existing. I concede, however, that the world might be moving in the direction of a global security paradigm if institution-building continues and leads to complexes of common practices, shared rules of behavior, and capabilities for the enforcement of these rules (Keohane, 1989:163). Third, I will examine the explanatory value of the various concepts of security and to what degree they contribute to theory-building. As they provide only limited explanations for international security affairs and are of marginal value for theory-building, I will identify some assumptions and questions to be clarified in future research that will lead to new hypotheses and "differentiated theory" (George and Smoke, 1974:637). Finally, I will delineate both the content and the reach of the field of international security studies and its relationship to both strategic studies and the traditional discipline of international relations.

In preparing this paper and reading the body of literature on international relations of both European and American origin, I felt much like a dwarf standing on the shoulders of giants: on the one hand rich because of the broad body of knowledge to stand on and at the same time humble in recognizing how much I owe to scholars and friends like E. O. Czempiel, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, and James Rosenau. What could I contribute that had not been said or written before on both sides of the Atlantic, much more knowledgeably and without doubt more eloquently? Could I solve the "security puzzle" or at least chart the way to its solution?

I.

Three decades ago Arnold Wolfers in his book *Discord and Collaboration* (1962:147) characterized national security as an "ambiguous symbol" that "may not have any precise meaning at all." Alastair Buchan (1966:24) writes, "Security is a word with many meanings." Most authors limit themselves to equating security with the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation from external overthrow or attack.

Richard Löwenthal (1971:11), from a German perspective, in addition emphasizes safeguarding political and social self-determination. Joseph Nye (1988:6) concurs that today most security policies are designed to insure "social autonomy as a group, and a degree of political status, not merely to insure the physical survival of individuals within national boundaries." He adds another criteria: "a certain minimal expected enjoyment of economic welfare." Like Nye, Richard Ullman (1983:123) argues that "defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality." He suggests a broader definition:

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life

for the inhabitants of a state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. (1983:135)

This definition takes account of a broad variety of contingencies, but it requires further clarification and raises questions of applicability. And it must be seen—as should the other definitions—in a specific cultural context: the highly industrialized democracies of the West. Other countries have very different concepts of security. Most developing countries emphasize the economic and social as well as the domestic dimensions of security. The Soviet term “besopasnost” means freedom from fear; Moscow’s security policy has been an instrument of system maintenance.

Taking account of these different interpretations, British political scientist Barry Buzan (1983:6) tries to avoid this tangle and argues that national security “cannot be defined in any general sense, but only in relation to specific cases.” In his seminal study on *The National Security Problem in International Relations* (1983) he thus restricts himself to an ideographic treatment of the security problem.¹

Social science, however, cannot not be content with explaining singular cases while disregarding the task of devising general theses or at least concepts applicable to a cluster of cases. I will start with a very elementary, “generic” definition of “security” as value and/or system maintenance over time, and the absence of threats to it. I will ask which values or systems are to be maintained.

II.

The evolution of the security paradigm and the changes from “national security” to “international security” to “global security,” each based on different theoretical and political assumptions, are closely linked to the historical evolution of the international system and the intellectual progress in its interpretation. In each phase we find competing interpretations, one realist and the other idealist, based on different, theoretical assumptions about the nature of man and the behavior of states. Often there is a third interpretation, an effort to bridge the gap and to develop converging concepts, building on the ability of man and states for rational behavior. Historical experience will show which one prevails and why.

Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. Its historical evolution is linked to the extension of the boundaries of the international system, from one of regionally bounded nation-states, to the highly interdependent political systems of the industrialized world, to a global community of people. Advances in communication, the technological perfection of waging war, and the growth of industry and commerce have contributed to this progress (North, 1990).

Human experience and learning have extended another set of boundaries: those of knowledge about security-building. War and diplomacy as regulatory processes were joined and modified by balance of power systems, by arms control regimes, and by institutional arrangements to further cooperation.

III.

The paradigm of *national security* emerged in a specific historical setting. With the birth of the nation-state in the Seventeenth Century and its interest in national

¹ In his revised second edition of *Peoples, States, and Fear*, forthcoming in 1991, Barry Buzan seems to retreat from an ideographic approach and to adopt a systemic and integrative approach to security. See “The Case for a Comprehensive Definition of Security and the Institutional Consequences of Accepting It.” Center for Freds- og Konfliktforskning, København: Arbejdspapirer 4/1990.

survival, national security became a prominent concern. To end “the war of all against all” (Hobbes, 1651/1957) and to secure a state of domestic peace, citizens defer to a powerful sovereign who, in turn, promises the end of religious and civil war.² In the international arena, struggle pits each state against every other. The system of nation-states lacks common rules and institutions of law enforcement. Diplomacy and war are the prime means to further national causes; statesmen and diplomats are the prominent actors; war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means (to paraphrase Clausewitz, 1853/1963). The sovereign, whether a prince in a constitutional monarchy or the citizens themselves in a democracy, is entrusted with securing domestic peace and safeguarding the life and the property of the people against any foreign threat.

Against this realist design, Kant (1795/1954) proposes a scheme of “perpetual peace” as a moral norm to be followed by sensible men. His proposal is based on the conviction that the system of nation-states and of dominating national interests can be restructured by an enlightened political order—a republican constitution, a federal state system, and a global citizenship—to forge a community of mankind. For him a compelling reason for nation-states to subsume their national interests under the rule of international law is the rational insight and the moral commitment of individual citizens to a community of mankind.

In a third line of thought, De Grotius (1625/1969), like Kant, describes international politics in terms of a society of states. As opposed to the Hobbesian tradition, he contends that states are not engaged in a simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions (Bull, 1977:26). But contrary to the Kantian or universalist perspective, Grotius accepts the Hobbesian premise that sovereign states, rather than individual human beings, are the principal actors in international politics. International politics expresses neither complete conflict between states nor complete identity of interest. The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states in their dealings with one another are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. But, as opposed to the view of the Kantians, what these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind but rather the acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states (Bull, 1977:27). With no supranational authority for their enforcement, laws do not suffice. Laws “regulate” behavior but do not change it. To circumscribe the actions of “insecure” or “non-saturated states,” as Bismarck has called them, political incentives for restraint have to be developed. Historic efforts at institution-building have been the Concert of Europe, created at the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), and Europe’s balance-of-power system in the Nineteenth Century, their purpose being to enhance the security of nation-states, not to prevent war. (To safeguard the balance of power, war and diplomacy were still necessary.)

Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian ideas outlined the main elements of future concepts of security. Hobbes prepared the ground for the realist tradition in political theory. Kant, the mastermind of German Idealism, appealed to the moral impetus of man and his desire for a better world; his ideas are guiding principles for the liberal tradition. The gap is bridged by Grotius and his effort to further the rule of law by institution-building. I will call this the institutional approach.

At first glance, the paradigm of national security responds to political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of global security follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a community of mankind and political processes con-

² To provide stark contrasts, I use the Hobbesian paradigm instead of the more differentiated one by Locke, although I share Bull’s (1977) argument that Locke’s description of international relations as a society without central authority is more appropriate than Hobbes’s of international anarchy.

trolled by enlightened men. The paradigm of international security, in turn, becomes meaningful with the formation of security regimes and the building of international institutions as Grotius has recommended. A more careful examination, however, reveals that the different traditions overlap, and we find elements of realism, idealism, and institution-building in each period. A historical survey of security affairs will show their respective prominence and decline. It is a story of achievements and failures, of progress and regression.

IV.

The European balance-of-power system in the Nineteenth Century was not compatible with the emergence of totalitarian regimes like Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany in the Twentieth Century. The former could deal with the rise of a continental hegemon, like Napoleon or Wilhelm II, and it was successful in counterbalancing their aspirations.³ But it could not cope with the dissolution of the basis for the balance-of-power system which, in a rational calculation of national interest, depended on restraint and reconciliation.

The League of Nations, founded under the impact of World War I, was to provide a radical alternative: the carefully calibrated balance of forces would be replaced by a system of collective security. It was to include among its members any potential attacker, and it rested on the premise that a threat to the security of one member was a threat to all that called for adequate response by each. In proposing his concept of collective security, President Wilson stressed the need for "a new and more wholesome diplomacy" (Claude, 1962:111). Not a balance of power but a "community of power" was Wilson's ideal (Waltz, 1959:118). In the new system all states would cooperate in the common cause of providing security and justice for all rather than engaging in competition and coercion. The same standards of conduct that were observed among individual citizens would apply to nations and their governments. International organization was to provide for the rule of law, if not for world government. While the League of Nations did not discriminate against any country, its corollary, the Versailles Treaty, set Germany apart and thus sowed the seeds of future conflict.

Realists such as Carr (1939/1966) and Morgenthau (1948) challenged the Wilsonian scheme on the grounds that it presupposes a harmony of interests among states and relations among them governed by ideas and morality, while in reality they were ruled by national interests and power. Wilson had wanted to abolish the balance-of-power system and the political preponderance of a nation or group of nations (with its negative effects on small and weak nations). Carr, to strengthen international stability, argued for the dominance of a superior power: "The new international order can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently coherent and sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries of lesser units. Whatever moral issues may be involved, there is an issue of power which cannot be expressed in terms of morality" (1966:235). Writing in 1939, Carr foresaw a *Pax Americana* or a *Pax Britannica* as most likely to be imposed on a divided and weakened Europe.

With the Atlantic Charter, in the 1940s, two new elements were added to the old concept of national security: it was recognized that a security system would last only if it relied on both a renunciation of force and a respect for human rights. The United Nation's Charter is built on these two pillars. It stipulates that the security of all members shall be guaranteed by a system of collective security (in exceptional

³ I differ somewhat from Mandelbaum (1988) who in his excellent analysis terminates the European balance-of-power system before World War I. I do not, however, give a historical account but aim to explain systemic changes.

situations permitting the use of force for self-defense), and it promotes universal norms and principles for individuals as well as for states. Security Council membership and voting arrangements give the five war-time allies an oversight role. The United Nations is the latest effort to manage international conflict by creating global institutions for peace-keeping.

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations systems failed because of the dominance of national over collective security interests. While the League of Nations failed to cope with the rise of Fascism and Nazism and collapsed on the eve of World War II, the United Nations became ineffective with the emergence of two preponderant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their mutually exclusive claim for world dominance which gave rise to the Cold War. The West perceived the Communist claim for dominance as a challenge to the ideals and principles upon which Western societies were built as well as a threat to the territorial integrity of its political systems. As a consequence, the Hobbesian paradigm of national security regained prominence in international affairs. National survival, not international security or world government, was the nation's prime goal. It was significant that the leading journal of the time devoted to questions of security was called *Survival*.⁴

The requirements of national security dictated that states maintain military forces and a large array of weapons systems adequate to the perceived military threat. For the superpowers, the ultimate weapon was nuclear weapons deployed in accordance with the strategy of massive retaliation. For the smaller, non-nuclear nations, integration into military alliances under the leadership of the nuclear powers became mandatory. The West met the political challenge with a policy of containment and an array of alliance systems, while for the ideological competition with the Soviet Union it devised a counterideology of anti-communism and "free-worldism." NATO, the regional security regime spanning the Atlantic, incorporates the military, political, and ideological requirements of the West. The "crusade for freedom" was short-lived, but the reliance on nuclear weapons by both superpowers has significantly changed the nature of international relations.

In the absence of effective global institutions, the structure of the international system consisted of a combination of alliance networks and a system of nuclear deterrence, one regulating more cooperative and the other more confrontational relationships. Deterrence was based on mutual assured destruction coupled with a policy of mutual political restraint. With the credibility of (extended) nuclear deterrence diminishing, the elaborate system of U.S.-led military alliances is gradually eroding. The Atlantic Alliance is held together by the Harmel formula of two parallel tracks of military defense and political détente. Nuclear weapons systems are gradually being transformed from an instrument of warfare into an element of diplomacy and psychology—at least in the East-West context.

V.

In the 1960s, with the Cuban missile crisis as a catalyst, it was increasingly recognized that "the security dilemma" (Jervis, 1978)—that an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others—was not necessarily a zero-sum game but could be overcome by cooperative strategies. Alliance systems have long modified individual concepts of national interest and national survival. In the military domain, "flexible response" has been the "tit-for-tat" strategy gradually leading to cooperation among antagonists, as described by Axelrod (1984). Arms control aims at the joint management of the risks associated with military deployments. With the recognition that

⁴ *Survival* was founded in 1958 to serve as the journal for the newly founded Institute for Strategic Studies in London, now The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

even a modified strategy of national security might not prevent a nuclear holocaust, emphasis shifted to a paradigm of international instead of national security.

The concept of *international security* is based on a mutual interest in survival under conditions of nuclear deterrence and on recognition that an adversary will be deterred from attacking out of its own self-interest. This is more than political restraint. To be operational, patterns of partial or temporary cooperation are needed. Again, the concept spawned a programmatic journal: *International Security*. International security, in contrast to national security, implies that the security of one state is closely linked to that of other states, at least of one other state. States are interdependent in their security affairs such that the security of one is strongly affected by the actions of the other, and vice versa. This structure has been identified by Keohane and Nye (1977/1989) as complex interdependence; they assume that the realization of mutual vulnerability leads to the formation of regular patterns and to the evolution of regimes.

"International regimes are," according to Krasner, "defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (1983:1). Regimes are intervening variables between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other. As Keohane (1989:4) suggests, rules and principles need not necessarily be formally agreed upon by governments but should be observed over an extended period of time. Also, cooperation need not be the exclusive pattern; a structure will qualify as a regime if interactions are marked by a mixture of confrontation and cooperation as long as institutionalized procedures are followed.

Security regimes are defined by regularized cooperative behavior in issues relating to the national security of two or more states, governed by either explicit or implicit norms and rules which permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate (Keohane, 1980:33). Security regimes are patterns of security cooperation among states in a situation of quasi-anarchy where no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. Security regimes exist over time, but they often encompass only a limited number of states which share a common interest (such as survival under the threat of nuclear deterrence) but exclude other interests and nations. Cooperation "requires that the actions of separate (but in their actions interdependent) individuals and organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination" (Keohane, 1984:51). International cooperation presupposes effective institutions to constrain the behavior of states.

Institutions refer to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.⁵ Specific institutions can be defined in terms of their rules. These rules must be durable and must prescribe behavioral roles for actors, besides constraining activity and shaping expectations. Social patterns of learning contribute to recurrent practices of cooperation. Some institutions, such as alliances, are formal organizations with prescribed hierarchies and the capacity for purposive action. Others, such as arms control arrangements, are complexes of rules and norms, the core elements of which have been negotiated and explicitly agreed upon by states. International institutions have the potential to facilitate cooperation; they reduce uncertainty and costs (Keohane, 1989). Without shared norms and principles, however, institutions may emerge but will not endure.

The liberal institutionalist belief that patterns of cooperative behavior will lead to the formation of international institutions is challenged by a number of authors.

⁵ Keohane defines regimes as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations" (1989:4). Occasionally he uses the analytical concepts of regimes and specific institutions interchangeably.

Realists argue that “interests and power relationships . . . are the proximate, not just the ultimate, cause of behavior in the international system” (Strange, 1983:345). In a world of sovereign states seeking to maximize their interest, lasting commitments to rules and norms—and thus security regimes—are rather rare.

If patterns of international relations are primarily explained by the distribution of military and economic capabilities among states, then institutionalist concepts are not always useful. Jervis (1983) and Oye (1986b) maintain that game theory models are more appropriate than regime models to explain most cases of “Cooperation under Anarchy”,⁶ as narrow and short-run self-interest accounts for cooperation and restraint, not common rules and principles. The obvious class of models is Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken, in which cooperation is desirable to reap the mutual benefit but is not automatic. Outcomes vary according to the strategies of reciprocity used and the conditions of play prevailing.

The actions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the past two decades did indeed resemble the behavior of the delinquents in a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Neither superpower attacked the other or challenged the other’s vital interests; they cooperated to prevent their own destruction. But this cooperation does *not* constitute a security regime. Though both Washington and Moscow on various occasions agreed on common principles and rules, each side interpreted them differently. Even major arms control agreements like the ABM Treaty or the SALT I Agreement, the core elements of the cooperative relationship, were implemented only with reservations. By 1980 the cooperative relationship—“*détente*”—had broken down completely as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American return to a strategy of containment.

Limited cooperation was resumed in the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed control over the course of Soviet policy and set out to reform the Communist system, and when President Reagan’s strategy of reconstructing American strength was seriously curtailed by financial and budget constraints. Domestic necessity—the need to reduce transaction costs—rather than insight has motivated both nations to abandon the unilateral pursuit of security and construct a joint security regime. And they did so in a situation when the ability of each to destroy the other—and thus deterrence—was basically still intact.

So far, only the contours of an emerging security regime are visible. It is based on symmetrical military doctrines emphasizing defense, mutually profitable arms control, and—possibly in the future—economic agreements. But will the American intent to project power globally be compatible with a Soviet-American security regime based on mutual restraint? And will an economically weak Soviet Union, plagued internally by separatism and political strife, be a reliable partner in joint institution-building?

How can this regime be extended to other areas and linked with other security regimes? A Soviet-American security regime with its emphasis on nuclear deterrence and arms control is but a regional security regime. It takes account of threat perceptions within a specific, homogeneous region from the Atlantic to the Urals and devises adequate institutions, but it will be no exemplar for other regions. Under its umbrella, in the emerging European security system, the emphasis is on institution-building in order to integrate and bind a united Germany. In the Third World, emphasis is on internal stability, ethnic homogeneity, and economic growth.

Though a concept of international security offers a better prescription for current security affairs than a strategy of national security, in its present form it has serious conceptional deficits and cannot be applied globally. It carries with it the notion of its origin, the preoccupation with nuclear weapons and deterrence, and is highly ethno-

⁶ This is the title of a seminal special edition of *International Organization*, edited by Oye (1986a).

centric, based on U.S. perceptions and values (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988). It does not account for future military contingencies that are not all-out nuclear war but small wars in the Third World, or for the fact that threat perceptions—at least in the First World—have changed from military attacks to economic and ecological crises. So far the usefulness of the concept of international security is limited to that of a regionally limited regime.

VI.

To overcome the limitations inherent in the prevailing concepts, hitherto neglected dimensions of security—economy, ecology, the domestic foundations of security—have to be included and the applicability to different areas and regions made feasible (Krell 1980). Also, the ethnocentricity of traditional approaches has to be overcome. As the biggest problem is regionalization, a search has begun for a new and common paradigm for global security.

Global security refers to a system of world order or security. It embodies a program of common security for the global community of men, as proposed by the Palme Commission, an Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. In its report *Common Security* which was subtitled *A Blueprint For Survival* (1982:4), the Commission argues for replacing the strategy of mutual deterrence with one of common security that rests on a commitment to joint survival and a program for arms control and disarmament. It further calls for a transformation of the international system to make it capable of peaceful and orderly change, suitable for trade and travel, and conducive to the intercultural exchange of ideas and experience.

In the Kantian tradition, the paradigm of global security is but a utopia: nonexistent but theoretically possible (Bloch, 1959). Global security will lead to a situation of global peace, not in the sense of a hegemonial “Pax Americana” or “Pax Sovietica,” but as a condition in which each nation and each individual can enjoy justice and happiness (in the Judeo-Christian sense of “shalom” as well as in the philosophical tradition of enlightenment).

A system of world order, a global security system, presupposes a universal concept of security with a shared set of norms, principles, and practices which result in common patterns of international behavior. The construction of an all-encompassing concept of security over time and regions will depend on our assumptions about the nature of the international system.

According to Waltz (1979) a system is composed of a structure and interacting units. Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered; second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across units. In a quasi-anarchical or self-help system, units worry about their survival, and this worry conditions their behavior. The system thus encourages states to seek security. Increased power in terms of capabilities may but need not serve this end. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain or improve their relative positions in the system.

With structures defined by the arrangement of parts and the international system characterized by anarchy, according to Waltz, the evolution of a global security system requires radical systems change. Or is Ruggie (1986:148) right in criticizing Waltz for overlooking the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions—what he calls “dynamic density”—as determinants of change in world politics? By neglecting unit-level processes, Waltz’s theory cannot account for change.

Today, social scientists observe two forces of change: one internal affecting the capability of states (and thus vindicating Waltz) and the other relating to patterns of interaction among units (as emphasized by Ruggie). The rise of Gorbachev, his policy of “perestroika,” and renewal and reconstruction in both domestic and for-

eign policy are internal processes within the Soviet Union leading to changes in its capabilities. In an age of global interdependence where states and societies are highly sensitive and often vulnerable to interactions with other states and societies, even politics in an authoritarian country like the Soviet Union—unless it is reconverted into a “Gulag” as under Stalin—cannot be completely shielded from outside influences. The result is a transformation of the international structure from bipolar to multipolar, and in international relations from the dominance of national interests to the emergence of common norms and rules.

A global security system, however, presupposes strong institutions—potentially a world government—to regulate interactions between units and to enforce its rules and norms. The failure of both the League of Nations and, a generation later, the United Nations attests to the difficulty of establishing a global peacekeeping system. The historical emphasis on military force has contributed to a truncated concept of security. Change will take place only if states realize that they will maximize their gains with cooperative, not dissociative, strategies. To assure success we must examine the area where the Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian concepts of security converge: in building institutions around common interests, in facilitating the evolution of shared norms and principles, and in furthering a common understanding of the problems confronting mankind.

VII.

The Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian concepts of security neither provide an adequate security paradigm nor explain in a satisfactory manner the changes in security relations we witness in many parts of the world today. To clarify our concept of security and to construct an empirically testable paradigm, we must define the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “set of scope conditions” that, according to Lakatos (1970), are required for a “progressive” research program that will lead to new facts and explanations. We might do well to follow Keohane’s counsel (1989:37) to apply somewhat “softer,” more interpretative standards than Lakatos has suggested.

We need to clarify whether our present research programs are adequate to construct new paradigms and theories on the basis of novel insights. Above all, they should reveal the deficits of existing concepts and the essential parameters of a new paradigm. Our expectation is that institutionalism may yield answers to questions that realism and idealism could not provide.

A new paradigm of security should specifically meet the following demands: 1) it should explain diversity and change—differences in various regions, transition from one dominant concept to another, systems transformation; 2) it should be multi-focused, not limited to a single issue-area or level of analysis.

The Hobbesian tradition, realism and neorealism,⁷ teaches us to recognize the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities among its units. Empirical evidence, however, shows that states cannot be treated as black boxes, that individual policy makers, bureaucratic structures, and domestic politics matter. While structural realism enhances our understanding of the structure of the international system and the effects of the distribution of capabilities among its parts, comparative policy research, political psychology, and organizational theory offer approaches and models to assist us in opening the black box and explaining the actions of states. Robert Putnam (1988) has contributed path-breaking research on two-level analysis.

⁷ Basically, I follow Keohane (1989:7–10) in the use of the labels “realism,” “neorealism,” and “liberalism.” Instead of “neoliberal institutionalism” I use the somewhat simpler term “institutionalism.”

The Kantian contribution is the emphasis on moral commitment and the rule of law. Liberalism stresses the impact of human-created institutions in affecting political behavior. It emphasizes the ability of men to influence and change patterns of action and to build institutions, and it reflects a belief that enlightened men can cumulatively achieve progress in human affairs. The liberal hope that a collective security system would overcome the problems inherent in the security dilemma has been disappointed time and again. Sophisticated versions of liberal theory, however, address the way transnational interactions and the development of international norms can interact with the domestic politics of states in an international system to transform how these states define their interests. (Keohane and Nye, 1977/1989:xi)

The Grotian or institutionalist perspective blends the two seemingly contradictory approaches.⁸ States do cooperate regularly because it is in their own best interest to do so. Cooperation pertaining to particular sets of issues in international relations is reinforced by social learning and results in specific patterns of behavior and institutions. International institutions are significant to states' actions because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of common interest; they thus affect the formulation of security concepts and strategies. A growing specialization among units resulting from a division of labor leads to increasing participation of states in joint decision making and contributes to a transformation of the atomistic structure of the international system.

All three traditions and the schools that build on them contribute to a better understanding of the prevalent concepts of security. For developing a general paradigm of security much further theoretical and empirical research is necessary. At this stage, however, a few hypotheses can be formulated toward designing a "progressive" research program.

1. Threat perceptions and security concepts are formulated as a result of political and social processes within states; they are in varying degrees sensitive to transnational interactions. Research is necessary to establish:

Under what conditions and to what degree security concepts are shaped in response to domestic or international demands.

How changes in the structure of the international system—such as bipolar to multipolar—and in the distribution of capabilities among states in terms of military or economic power affect the formulation of national security concepts.

Which processes contribute most to making states adaptive to transnational interactions, and which reduce adaptiveness; and the impact of transnational and international interactions on changes in national security concepts.

2. Regional variations of security concepts can be explained by different national priorities (Haftendorn, 1989) and the resulting security strategies, which are in part culturally and geopolitically determined.

Besides cultural and geopolitical variations, what other factors shape national security strategies; how are security strategies (common to the states of a region or an alliance) formed and modified?

What is the relationship between military threats and other—economic, ecologic, internal—challenges; under which conditions will one gain prominence over the other?

3. Changes from one concept to another take place on a historical continuum. One factor contributing to change is the growing impact of transnational interconnectedness and interdependence, which increasingly forces states to adapt to inter-

⁸ Otto Keck (1990) first called my attention to the capacity of the "new institutionalism" to blend the realist and the liberal approach.

national interactions. In the West awareness has grown that security can no longer exclusively or predominantly be realized unilaterally. The provision of security necessitates cooperation rather than confrontation between states. Some challenges, such as the "greenhouse effect," can only be met on a global scale.

Is the growing awareness of the necessity for cooperative strategies limited to the Western industrialized states? There is evidence that the Soviet Union and other East European states are beginning to share this notion; what causes them to recognize it, and what are the prospects for Third World countries also to embrace it in a regional context?

Does a rational calculation of costs and benefits contribute to change in behavior, or are patterns of action transformed as a result of social learning?

4. In the East-West conflict, nuclear weapons have produced a delicate but basically stable balance of deterrence and self-deterrence which has transformed these weapons from instruments of warfare to instruments of diplomacy. Because of its destructiveness, deliberate nuclear war has become unacceptable and is no longer a likely contingency. In addition, a mutually reinforcing, incredibly expensive arms race has nurtured its own reversal and has stimulated a search for mutually profitable arms control agreements. In the West, military contingencies are increasingly replaced by economic and ecological challenges to the well-being of societies and states.

Have the changes in threat perception and security strategies been brought about primarily by the economic costs of maintaining arms races, or by the political inacceptability of nuclear weapons, or by new challenges of the indiscriminate destructiveness posing an even greater threat?

What has been the role of new technologies, especially in communication, and of new management strategies in bringing about these changes?

What have been the primary forces of change: the mass public or the political elites, and in what kind of interactive processes?

5. A mixture of self-interest and positive experience with transnational interactions and international institutions has reinforced the cooperative behavior of states in security affairs. It has been facilitated by specific regular patterns of action and by negotiated institutions.

If the ability to cooperate is supported by regimes and institutions, what causes states to transform existing patterns of conflictual interaction into more durable institutions with common practices, rules, and norms?

If institutions are half-way houses between recurrent but informal practices and formal organizations, how much informality is necessary to provide flexibility and how much organization to insure stability?

To what degree do international institutions provide new opportunities for the specialization and participation of units and, as a result, contribute to the transformation of the structure of the international system?

Why are there so few security regimes in an East-West context, including the United States and the Soviet Union, and even fewer pertaining to Third World countries and regions?

To answer these questions, recent writings on interdependence, regimes, and institutions provide a promising point of departure. They need, however, to be applied to the study of security issues. Further empirical research might also solve a contradiction in Keohane's approach to international institutions when he postulates a "limited explanatory impact of systems structure" (1989:13) but at the same time assumes

that "variations in the degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior" (1989:2–3).

These are just some of the research questions that need to be answered before a general paradigm of security can be constructed. A Promethean, global research effort is needed to solve the security puzzle and to guide our work for global peace and security.

VIII.

Security studies as an academic field is in need of clarification: what is to be studied, how is it to be studied, and how is security studies to be distinguished from various subfields on the one hand and international relations on the other? At present, the field of security studies is highly compartmentalized and ranges from peace research to strategic studies. It suffers from the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are.

Peace research has been somewhat discredited because of its Kantian orientation toward global peace and its focus on the most obvious but often not the most relevant obstacles to global peace. Most researchers follow an idealist or liberal approach; they use a broad selection of methods, ranging from normative paradigms and behavioral approaches to critical theories. Though some of their results have indeed been trail-blazing, few have been applied to policy making.

Strategic studies, in contrast, follow a more limited thematic approach. Its focus is on the military dimensions of security, with special attention to nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. Most researchers use a Hobbesian national security paradigm, and, in their normative orientation, are committed to the goal of national survival. Their approach is often technical, and scant attention is devoted to the political, economic, and cultural aspects of security.

In the United States the field of international security studies has often been equated with strategic studies; its emphasis on technical problems has made it unduly narrow. In contrast, European researchers have tended to shy away from the "hard facts" of weapons systems, nuclear strategy, and employment doctrines. For them, peace research has provided an easy way out of a field where intellectually and morally acceptable solutions are hard to achieve.

The dichotomy between peace research on the one hand and strategic studies on the other need not be. International security studies could integrate both. Research and teaching should focus on the various paradigms and problems of security as well as its political, economic, cultural, and other implications. Strategic studies, with its emphasis on military aspects of security, is one area of the field.

Ethnocentrism, a limitation in the past, could be an asset in the form of culturally acquired special expertise. U.S. scholars would teach others about nuclear weapons and strategy under conditions of nuclear deterrence. Europeans have always considered history a necessary foundation for empirical studies; they are also experts on the economic dimensions of security. Third World scholars would share their knowledge of regional conflicts and the domestic dimensions of security. Security studies could thus develop into a truly international discipline; it would be studied from an interdisciplinary and intercultural perspective committed to the goal of global security (Haftendorn, 1988; Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988).

With this interdisciplinary and intercultural perspective in mind, a set of relevant topics can be formulated for teaching international security, including the following:

- theory and history of peace, war, and conflict;
- values, cultural heritage and threat perceptions;
- concepts of regional, international, and global security;

security regimes and institution-building;
 economic, natural resource, and ecological dimensions of security; challenges of
 terrorism and drug traffic;
 impact of technology and information dissemination on international conflict;
 decision-making in crisis situations;
 defense policies of states and their domestic foundation;
 nuclear strategy, weapons systems, arms control, and disarmament.

Care must be taken, however, to clarify the relationship between international security studies on the one hand and international relations on the other. International relations as a discipline has traditionally focused on peace and war, on international conflicts and their resolution, and on relations between states and international institutions (Czempiel, 1965). In the course of its evolution, the normative approach has been partly superseded by a positivistic or behavioralist emphasis on value-neutral data. Recently, however, with game theory (Oye, 1986a) and "new institutionalism" (Keohane, 1989), normative orientations have come back into the field. The dichotomy between a normative and an empirical science can be overcome if researchers keep in mind their moral responsibility for the political implications of their research and their commitment to the promotion of international peace (Daase and Moltmann, 1989). The fields of international relations and security studies should not therefore be distinguished by their relationship to values.

I propose to consider international security studies a subfield of the traditional international relations discipline. The expanded focus of security studies to encompass its political, economic, and cultural dimensions tends indeed to blur the boundaries between field and subfield; the latter should not deal with the whole universe but rather with a defined set of core security paradigms. The international relations discipline can enrich international security studies by providing the theories and methods necessary for both conceptualization and analysis. Security studies will yield theoretical explanations and empirical findings on the manifestations and conditions of security. Instead of harmful competition between the two fields, I foresee their happy and lasting marriage.

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